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U.S. Makes Headway on Japanese Peace Treaty

WASHINGTON — The recent visit of John Foster Dulles, Republican adviser to the Department of State, to Britain and France for discussion of his draft of a Japanese peace treaty points up the one aspect of Far Eastern policy about which American official intentions are clear. The concept of Japan as the Asian bastion of the New World—and of our European allies—has been developing in an orderly manner as contrasted with changing and vacillating attitudes in Washington toward China, Korea and Formosa.

Militarization Policy

Under the treaty as now drafted Japan would be permitted to rearm and would be expected to rely for its security on its own military power and on the United States. Thus, the recently defeated country would become in a most explicit way a shield of the West in the conflict with the Soviet East. The U.S.S.R. on June 10 recommended the negotiation of a treaty which would include the antimilitarization principle stated in President Roosevelt's Cairo Declaration (1943) and in the American-Russian-British agreements at Yalta and Potsdam (1945). The United States, however, is ready to negotiate a treaty without the Soviet Union—although linguistic purists might call it a convention of friendship rather than a treaty of peace, since not all participants in the war are likely to guarantee the peace. Washington's problem, therefore, is to win support not from Moscow but from the countries with which we were friendly during World War II and remain friendly today and from the Japanese themselves.

The American interest in Japanese militarization and in the negotiation of a sepa-

rate peace has developed slowly and methodically since the failure to work out a treaty acceptable to all the interested powers. In July 1947 the United States suggested that the members of the Far Eastern Commission (representing the states which had been at war with Japan) confer on a peace treaty. The Soviet Union proposed instead that the Council of Foreign Ministers (made up of the United States, Britain, France and Russia) draft the treaty. Efforts of the Council to negotiate a German treaty had failed in March and April 1947 at the Moscow conference. The United States, supported by the British and French, declined to accept the Soviet counterproposal. The rapid deterioration of Russo-American relations, which was already apparent in 1947, aroused suspicion in Moscow and Washington that each power intended to use Japan to its own advantage. This mistrust is a steeper barrier to agreement than differences over the mechanics of negotiation.

The 1947 stalemate left the United States in primary control of Japan, since the supreme commander of the occupation was an American, General Douglas MacArthur, and most of the occupation troops were Americans. While this arrangement was expensive to the United States and irked the Japanese, who had begun to look forward to the national sovereignty that a treaty would restore to them, the United States remained opposed to negotiation which, while freeing it from occupation costs, might at the same time result in a treaty advantageous to Soviet interests. When the Russian representative at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in June 1949—concerning the Berlin blockade—raised the question of peace for

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Japan, he was ignored by the United States, Britain and France.

Views of Europe and Asia

When, four months after the Paris conference, the Chinese Communists established their authority over all of mainland China, Washington's passive willingness to keep Japan under the military protection of the occupation without a treaty was transformed into eagerness to have Japan restored to independence by a treaty and able to protect itself. Secretary of State Dean Acheson hinted at the strategic importance the Administration by then assigned to Japan when he defined United States Far Eastern policy in a speech at the National Press Club in January 1950. The pressure of Japanese officials and private citizens for a treaty began to disturb American officials, who feared that it would work to the advantage of the Soviet Union. To sound out leading Japanese, Mr. Dulles visited the islands in June 1950, on the eve of the Korean war. While that war, which divides the former anti-Japanese allies into two hostile camps, prevents the negotiation of a real treaty of peace, it has quickened Washington's interest in the remilitarization of Japan by arrangements which would link Japan's interests with those of the United States. The Korean war has demonstrated the strategic usefulness of Japan in an era of conflict, both as an advanced supply base and an aerial attack base for the United Nations. The Korean war, however, is not an adequate test of Japan's usefulness; for Japan itself has not been attacked.

Serious negotiation of the Japanese separate peace treaty began early in the spring,

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when Mr. Dulles visited Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and reached a climax with his visit to Britain and France, from which he returned on June 15.

Negotiations in Europe and the Pacific have been for the most part successful. Australia and New Zealand mistrust Japan, whose armies and navies approached close to their shores during World War II. To give those countries confidence in the rearming of Japan, the State Department has encouraged this year the creation of a Pacific alliance of mutual defense, the idea of which it disapproved in 1949 and 1950. Washington's new attitude toward the alliance has softened opposition to the peace treaty in the South Pacific. The Philippine Republic wants reparations from Japan; the United States may induce the Philippines to change this attitude by generous grants in its new foreign aid program. The United States announced in May 1949 that Japan could pay reparations only at "staggering" cost to the American Treasury, which was then subsidizing the Japanese economy and continues to do so today.

The chief issue in Europe arose from Britain's request that the Chinese Communist government be permitted to sign the

treaty. India earlier had expressed the same opinion. The United States recognizes, not the Communists, but the Nationalist government of China in exile on Formosa and prefers to have that government sign the treaty. Mr. Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison resolved the issue by agreeing that the Japanese themselves should designate the Chinese government which would sign. On the surface this agreement raises the possibility that a power friendly to Russia will have a share in decisions about Japan's future. Actually, however, it can be taken for granted that Japan will choose the Chinese government favored by the United States. Moreover, the Chinese signatory is to sign an instrument that others will have negotiated. It is not to take part in the negotiations.

Japan and the Soviet Union

The treaty draft satisfies the Japanese government, which apparently now accepts the prospect of nonparticipation by the U.S.S.R., of remilitarization (despite the antimilitarization clause in Japan's post-war constitution), and of the continued presence of American troops in Japan as defenders of bases instead of as occupying forces. Japanese Communists, as expected,

oppose the draft. Japanese Socialists have been so uncertain about the treaty that they failed to come to any conclusions when they met on June 3 and put off their decision to June 18.

Some Japanese, including the Socialists, interpreted the Soviet note of June 10 on Japan as an effort to create disunity in Japan and to weaken support of the treaty by America's allies. If that was the purpose, the result seems to have been quite the opposite in Japan and in Britain.

Another interpretation of Soviet motives is that the Moscow government is seeking to link discussion of Far Eastern problems to the discussion of European problems which the deputy foreign ministers in Paris have for months been trying to arrange. The United States on June 15 invited the Soviet Union a second time to take part in a Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in Washington this summer. In past exchanges on such a conference, however, the United States has blocked Soviet efforts to place on the agenda the North Atlantic treaty, which means the rearmament of Western Europe. It would take the same attitude concerning discussion of Japanese rearmament.

BLAIR BOLLES

Germany Returns to Center of European Stage

While the Washington hearings on the removal of General Douglas MacArthur continue to keep American public opinion focused on Asia, the future military, political and economic role of Germany remains the central problem of East-West relations in Europe.

Rearmament Nearer?

The three Western powers—the United States, Britain and France—are currently negotiating with the Bonn government concerning a new contractual relationship which would supplant the occupation statute, end the state of war and restore a large measure of sovereignty to West Germany, pending the conclusion of a German peace treaty (the peace treaty is one of the items on the agenda for the Big Four conference now being discussed in Paris).^{*} The three Western powers plan to replace the occupation statute by bilateral agreements with the West German state which would assure Bonn the greatest possible measure of equality while giving the Allies adequate guarantees that they can fulfill military security requirements. Once the new arrangement has gone into force, the Allied High Commission at

Bonn would be converted into an ambassadors' conference.

The negotiations for restoration of German sovereignty are closely linked with conversations about West German rearmament. When Washington, without preliminary soundings in Bonn, suddenly announced last autumn that the Germans should be rearmed, strong sentiment was expressed by the Germans against being used as "mercenaries" by their World War II enemies. Nor did the Germans look with favor on a subsequent compromise proposal by the French calling for the limitation of German troops to combat units which would be incorporated in a European army, thus avoiding the creation of a separate German force.

The Allied-German Military Committee, which has been studying the problem of German rearmament since January, is now reported to have rejected the French proposal. Instead, in line with the recommendations of German military experts, it is agreed that Germany should have an army of 12 infantry divisions with the requisite artillery and tank units in each division. The over-all German force contemplated at present—12 divisions with a peace strength of 15,000 men each and a war strength of 18,000 and supply service troops—is esti-

mated at 250,000 men. These troops would be raised by recruiting, with conscription to be used only as a last resort. The interim report of the Military Committee reveals that the Germans have asked for, and the Allies have agreed to, a German tactical air force for support of German ground forces fixed at the initial figure of 600 fighters.

American observers believe that if West Germany can be assured of having its own army, the Germans' previous opposition to rearmament will gradually wane. The plebiscite against remilitarization of Germany called for by the Communist-dominated government of East Germany aroused little interest in the West German state. The poll held on this issue in East Germany the first week of June (the question on the ballot was, "Are you against remilitarization and for a peace treaty for all Germany in 1951?") was reported to have been marked by apathy. According to official East German figures, 99.4 eligible voters (or 13,618,724) participated in the balloting, and of these, 95.98 per cent voted "yes," but 4.02 per cent, or 546,622, voted "no." It should be noted, however, that in elections held in the seven largest states of West Germany during the past year the Social Democrats registered marked gains, largely because of their vig-

^{*}See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, June 8, 1951.

orous opposition to rearmament. It is believed that should general elections be held at the present time, the Social Democrats would have a good chance of replacing Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democrats.

Germany's Aims

Once the West German state has recovered sovereignty and has been rearmed with the aid of the United States, will it become a loyal and determined member of the Western coalition against Russia, or will it seek to pursue German national aims irrespective of whether or not these clash with the aims of Washington, London and Paris? This problem is already casting a long shadow on relations between the Western powers and the Bonn government. Chancellor Adenauer, who is also foreign minister, has repeatedly indicated his desire to have the West German state become a member of the Western community of nations. He has vigorously supported the Schuman plan and in May welcomed the admission of West Germany as a full member of the Council of Europe.

The tide of nationalist sentiment, however, is running strong in West Germany, and the demand for reintegration of territories lost by Germany at the end of World War II is backed not only by the neo-Nazis but also by the Social Democrats under the leadership of the fiery Dr. Kurt Schumacher. On May 4 the Bonn government blueprinted Germany's case when the time comes for a peace treaty in a formal 800-word statement entitled "German Sovereignty," with a foreword by Dr. Adenauer. In this statement Bonn, which considers itself the only legitimate government of Germany with the right to speak for all Germans, including those now under Communist rule in the Russian occupation zone, outlined the Germans' territorial demands. These include the return of East Prussia, now held by Russia; the area east of the Oder-Neisse river-line now occupied by Poland; the Saar coal basin, at present under French suzerainty; and the small border districts annexed since World War II by Belgium and the Netherlands. An inkling of the deep-seated feeling of the Germans about these territorial issues was given at the end of May, when strong anti-French sentiment was expressed in West Germany over the Saar, where Saarland Premier Johannes Hoffmann, on virtual instructions from the French, banned a pro-German opposition party.

While Chancellor Adenauer sought to moderate anti-French sentiment, declaring

that "in politics, the person with the steadiest nerves is right," his own position is being challenged by Dr. Schumacher, on the one hand, and by reviving Nazis on the other. The results of parliamentary elections in the state of Lower Saxony on May 6, where the Socialist Reichs party, advocating Nazi ideas, received 366,709 votes, or 11 per cent of the total, have created anxiety both in Bonn and on the part of American observers. Following the elections, the Bonn government announced it would test the constitutionality of the Socialist Reichs party in the courts, and Chancellor Adenauer on May 9 pledged that "different from the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic is not going to grant freedom to the enemies of freedom to bring about another chaos." On May 25 Otto Ernst Rehmer, chief of the Socialist Reichs party, was sentenced to four months in jail for slandering the Bonn government, which he called "a reception station for Western Allied orders." Meanwhile, the Socialist Reichs party has announced its fusion with the extreme rightist Bavarian Economic Reconstruction party headed by Alfred Loritz. American observers acknowledge that the Communist party of Germany (as distinguished from the Communist-controlled Socialist Unity party of East Germany) is losing ground. Virtually all Communist newspapers have been banned in the West German state, and police action is being taken against Communist-run organizations. The pro-Nazis, however in many respects carry on the same anti-Western agitation as the Communists, and the Communists may give their support to neo-Nazi groups such as the Socialist Reichs party.

Bonn's Trade with East

The United States, already preoccupied by the re-emergence of Nazi ideas in West Germany, has also been alarmed by the extent of West German trade with the Eastern bloc, especially Communist China. During the first six months of the Korean war, legal West German trade with Communist China increased from \$413,000 in 1949 to \$11,330,000 in 1950, and illegal trade is estimated at another \$8,000,000. Although the Bonn government has promised to comply with the United Nations embargo on exports of war materials to China, new drastic measures to halt the flow of war supplies from West Germany are now being discussed in Washington by the Defense and State Departments with United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy. On June 13 the Society for Prevention of World War III charged

in New York that over 1,000 leading German firms are participating in illegal trade with the Eastern bloc countries.

This is not entirely surprising, for the outwardly favorable situation of Germany's foreign trade—a surplus of exports over imports was registered in April—is due to import restrictions, not to a marked increase in exports, and German industrialists, if left to themselves, may be expected to seek larger markets for their goods in the East. Meanwhile, in the East-West trade war, the U.S.S.R. is applying a new form of blockade on the exports of West Berlin to West Germany by demanding that certificates of the origin of the raw materials contained in 17 categories of manufactured goods be submitted to the Communist authorities. The Western powers advised Mayor Ernst Reuter of West Berlin not to comply with this demand and countered on June 16 by preventing exportation from West Berlin to East Germany of four different types of industrial equipment. On June 18 the U.S.S.R. claimed the right to control all shipments from West Berlin. Should this dispute, which is connected with current negotiations for a new east-west zone trade agreement, assume more serious proportions, the Western powers may consider a new Berlin airlift, this time to take goods out instead of bringing them in.

While the future of Germany will of course be affected over the long run by the course of world affairs, three main trends are now emerging within the West German state. First, the rapid decline of communism has by no means always redounded to the benefit of what we would call democracy. On the contrary, the beneficiaries of disillusionment with communism often are the extreme rightist parties imbued with Nazi ideas. The Social Democrats, strongly nationalistic but opposed to authoritarianism of both right and left, appear to be gaining strength while the Christian Democrats are losing ground. Second, determined American efforts to "re-educate" the Germans have not yet overcome a negative attitude toward democracy and toward political programs in general. And third, perhaps because of this negativism, most Germans so far view all outstanding issues—restoration of sovereignty, rearmament, recovery of lost territories, exports to the East—primarily from the point of view of what Germany can get from, rather than what it can contribute to, the international community.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of two articles on Germany and Big Four negotiations.)

The FPA Plans to Serve You Better

The next few months will bring many exciting changes in the services and publications of the Foreign Policy Association. These changes will provide information and assistance specifically designed to meet the pace of today's living and the urgency of tomorrow's problems.

Many of you have assisted in planning these changes through the answers you gave to the questionnaire which was sent to a sampling of members last year. Above all else, you wanted the FPA to reach more people and new areas of the population. Some of you even felt that this was the *only* way to improve public understanding of world affairs.

Collectively, you also indicated that FPA members are the leaders in their communities, through their professions and businesses or their activities in civic, church and other organizations. This means that you need certain kinds of services which can give you the fullest assistance where your responsibilities relate to international affairs.

With these requirements in mind, the Association is making the changes described below. Our aim is threefold: to provide more varied information (always retaining the accuracy and thoroughness for which the FPA has been known for thirty-three years), to increase services to our members and to stimulate the constant growth of the Association.

A New Bulletin

While the *Foreign Policy Reports* have been discontinued with the issue of June 15, a new *Foreign Policy Bulletin* will combine the best features of the *Report* series and the present *Bulletin*. This new eight-page *Bulletin*, to be issued semimonthly, will be launched on September 15. Its new features will include pro and con discussions of controversial policy issues by outstanding authorities, a regular Washington newsletter, a "World Roundup" providing a continuous summary of major developments in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East (an accurate and quick way of keeping abreast of world events and at the same time building a

permanent, handy reference file), book reviews and a column, "What Do Other People Think of the U.S.?" based on editorial comments abroad.

These new features will come to you in addition to the same brilliant analyses of current problems contained in the present *Bulletin* and frequent short background reports, modeled on the *Foreign Policy Reports*, dealing with international problems which will become tomorrow's headlines. We know you are going to like this new *Bulletin*.

Although the contents of the *Headline Series* will remain unchanged, the books will acquire a new cover in the autumn. With these two publications the Foreign Policy Association expects to serve you more effectively than ever before.

An important innovation is the creation of an Editorial Committee composed of 12 or 15 distinguished authorities in the field of international affairs, representing business, journalism, research and teaching, and public service. The primary functions of this committee will be to advise concerning the content, authorship and distribution of FPA publications and various means whereby they can be made more useful for the citizen's understanding of world problems.

New Services

Other new services, moreover, will be offered to members. You will receive reports on the activities of the FPA's community groups, news of special materials available for teachers, business men and women, organization leaders, and everyone actively concerned with international affairs.

The Foreign Policy Association will also prepare outlines to assist discussion leaders and teachers in making the best use of the most valuable materials available in this field. This is being done in response to requests from many groups of FPA members. The outlines will be used in many communities as the basis for stimulating discussions of foreign policy problems.

FPA groups throughout the country will now have access to a special "How To Do

FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON GERMANY

Germany and the Fight for Freedom, by General Lucius D. Clay. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. \$2.

A concise and sometimes critical evaluation of our postwar policy toward Germany. In the light of his convictions, the former Military Governor for Germany, U.S. Zone, urges a foreign policy committed to a stable Germany integrated in the composite defense and economy of Western Europe.

The German Catastrophe, by Friedrich Meinecke. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. \$3.

An illuminating book summing up the deeper causes for the rise and fall of Nazism by one of Germany's leading historians. Professor Meinecke believes that out of the humbling of national pride may come a renaissance of liberalism and sound morals.

Germany and the Future of Europe, edited by Hans J. Morgenthau. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950. \$3.50.

How to reconcile the physical superiority of Germany with the political interests of Europe is the binding link between this series of lectures by experts on the social, economic, constitutional and political aspects of the German problem in relation to the problems of Europe.

The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, by Edward H. Carr. Vol. I. New York, Macmillan, 1951. \$5.

This is the first volume of what is to be a three-volume history of Soviet Russia by a former official of the British Foreign Office, best known to American readers for his small book, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*. Mr. Carr devotes considerable attention to the methods by which Lenin and his associates, after the 1917 revolution and the civil war, reunited the diverse parts of the former Russian Empire, and to the Bolshevik doctrine of self-determination.

It" series to assist with every phase of organizing an effective community program in international affairs. (Examples of these are "How to organize a discussion group," "How to plan and run a large meeting," "How to have a successful membership campaign," "How to get publicity," etc.) Different techniques and projects will thus be made available to all of our groups in the most useful form possible.

These are our plans. They are designed to serve you. At the same time, we believe that they make a major contribution to increased public understanding of American foreign policy. To be most successful in achieving its aims, the Association needs the support and cooperation—as well as the constructive criticism and helpful suggestions—of every member.

BROOKS EMENY

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